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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to explain why the U.S. government came to the assistance of 
the Mexican and Brazilian governments in 1995 and 1998, respectively, but refused to do 
so during Argentina’s economic crisis in 2001.  At first glance, all three countries 
appeared attractive candidates for U.S. assistance—they had similarly enacted U.S.-
backed neoliberal reformist agendas prior to their crises.  The study argues that the 
decision by the U.S. government and the International Monetary Fund to issue a bailout 
to a country enduring an economic crisis is a carefully considered policy choice that 
results from a combination of that country’s geopolitical significance, as well as the 
ability of U.S. policymakers to learn and apply lessons from past policy experiences. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The three Latin American countries with the largest economies according to gross 
domestic product (GDP)—Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, respectively—have all 
suffered recent economic crises.  Governments in all three countries had previously 
implemented many of the neoliberal reforms mandated by the Washington Consensus 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In the 1990s, states that enacted reformist 
agendas were classified by Javier Corrales as shallow, intermediate, or aggressive based 
on the “evaluation of accomplishments in various reform categories dear to free-
marketeers: inflation reduction, trade opening, financial liberalization, fiscal deficit 
reduction, privatization of money-losing state owned enterprises, and deregulation of 
markets.”1  Both Mexico and Argentina were classified as aggressive reformers while 
Brazil was labeled an intermediate reformer.   
During its economic crisis in 1994–1995, Mexico received a bailout, or large and 
immediate loan package, from the United States and the IMF.  Similarly, when struck by 
its own crisis in 1998, Brazil received an even larger bailout with a majority of the 
funding coming from the United States and the IMF.  However, when, in December 
2001, an economic crisis hit Argentina, the Latin American country that was often said to 
have most stringently implemented liberal market policies, a bailout from the U.S. and 
the IMF was denied.  If all three of these states followed many orthodox economic 
prescriptions, then why did Mexico and Brazil receive bailouts from the United States 
and the IMF while Argentina did not?  
A. IMPORTANCE 
Given the large amounts of money associated with bailouts given to individual 
nations by the United States and the IMF, it is critical that we better understand the 
conditions under which these massive loans are granted.  Indeed, in the cases studied 
here, the sizes of the bailout packages have been significant: Mexico received  
 
1 Javier Corrales, “Market Reforms,” in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 74–
99 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 90. 
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$52.8 billion and Brazil received $41.5 billion.  By seeking to add to our understanding 
of why bailouts are granted (and also denied), this thesis not only helps us to understand 
the processes by which the U.S. government invests its money internationally, but it also 
holds direct normative implications for U.S. policymaking.  Are the U.S. spending 
processes arrived at through appropriate processes of deliberation in Congress, or do they 
largely consist of personalistic, presidential projects that sometimes confuse their own 
private interests or ideology with the public good? In my view, the will of the people via 
their representatives in Congress provides a better and more deliberate appropriations 
process than can be offered by the simple whims of a singular executive.  The legislative 
election cycle in the U.S. generally makes Congress more accountable to the public by 
providing an outlet for turnover every two years.   
At the descriptive level, the thesis will present a detailed description of a failed 
bailout in which the U.S. government wasted its money—the case of Brazil—in addition 
to the successful case of Mexico. The thesis leaves it to future research to explain the 
reasons why some bailouts successfully resolve crises, whereas others do not. 
B. BACKGROUND 
This thesis will seek to explain why the U.S. government came to the assistance 
of the Mexican and Brazilian governments in 1995 and 1998, respectively, but refused to 
do so during Argentina’s economic crisis in 2001.  It argues that the decision by the U.S. 
government and the IMF to issue a bailout to a country enduring an economic crisis is a 
carefully considered policy choice that results from a combination of that nation’s 
geopolitical significance as well as the ability of those policymakers to learn lessons from 
past policies. 
Prior to Mexico’s financial crisis in December 1994, both the U.S. government 
and Wall Street advertised Mexico’s free market economic policies as the model for other 
developing nations to follow.2  U.S. government and investor confidence in Mexico’s 
economy was at an all-time high as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
 
2 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 73. 
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began on January 1, 1994.  The Salinas government wanted to prove the durability and 
growth potential of Mexico’s increasingly globalized market, and NAFTA “codified the 
new rules of the game and greatly reduced the uncertainty faced by investors.”3  The new 
codes restrained the potential for sudden protectionist measures by both the Mexican and 
U.S. governments. In order to offer foreign investors a sense of stability, Mexico’s 
government committed to a fixed exchange rate for its currency, whereby the peso was 
pegged to the U.S. dollar at a ratio of about 3:1.4  
1994 was also a year of political turmoil in Mexico.  Specific examples of the 
domestic politic turmoil included the shocking, major revolt by the EZLN, or 
“Zapatistas,” an insurgency (which later departed from its violent tactics), as well as 
political upheaval and scandal in the wake of the assassinations of two major political 
figures, Luis Donaldo Colosio—the PRI's original presidential candidate—and Jose 
Francisco Ruiz Massieu, who was slated to become the leader of the PRI in the Chamber 
of Deputies of the Mexican Congress.5 It was also a presidential election year.  These 
factors increased Mexico’s “country risk” and startled international investors and the 
Mexican public, who began to sell their Mexican holdings.  This outflow triggered a 
rapid increase in the conversion of pesos to dollars as a result of rising devaluation fears.6  
The Mexican Central Bank was unable to maintain the fixed exchange rate and fueled the 
selloff until the peso fully devalued.   
The Mexican government could not contain the collapse of their currency and 
turned to international support.  The resulting loan package put together by the U.S. 
 
3 Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann and Lorenza Martínez, “Liberalization, Growth, and Financial 
Crises: Lessons from Mexico and the Developing World ,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (The 
Brookings Institution) 2003, no. 2 (2003): 1–88, 40. 
4 Crandall, United States and Latin America, 74. 
5 Gary L. Springer and Jorge L. Molina, “The Mexican Financial Crisis: Genesis, Impact, and 
Implications,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 57–81., 62. 
6 Devaluation reduces the profits of investors reliant on dollar denominated profit.  Crandall offers a 
simple example of how devaluation affects investment.  “Consider, an American firm that holds 300 pesos 
in profit at a time when the exchange rate is 3 pesos to U.S.$1 (3:1).  Thus, after going to the Mexican 
Central Bank to convert 3000 pesos at the 3:1 rate, the American firm’s profit is $100.  If there is a 
devaluation that suddenly bumps the exchange rate to 6 pesos to U.S.$1, then the profit of 300 pesos 
becomes only U.S.$50,” 74. 
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government, the IMF, and other international entities totaled $52.8 billion.7  The intent of 
this package was to stabilize the peso.  This bailout worked: Mexico’s economy rapidly 
shrugged the crisis and posted hearty economic growth with low associated inflation, and 
repaid the loan with interest in just two years.8  
Brazil’s currency, the real, was also linked to the dollar as a part of its broad 
economic strategy to maintain market stability and investor confidence.  In the wake of 
the Asian financial crisis, many economists predicted that Brazil would be the next 
country to fall.  In addition to the austerity measures put in place by Brazilian President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the U.S government and the IMF put together a bailout 
package totaling $41.5 billion.  This bailout was intended to preempt a massive selloff of 
the real by increasing Brazil’s foreign reserves and avoid devaluation in order to maintain 
their currency’s peg to the dollar.  This bailout did not prevent the devaluation of the real 
nor did it stave off economic crisis.  In other words, the bailout failed.9    
Much like Mexico, Argentina was often touted as the “poster child10” for 
countries looking to liberalize their economies.  It, too, tied its peso to the U.S. dollar via 
a fixed exchange rate of 1:1.  More so than either Mexico or Brazil, Argentina fervently 
clung to its fixed exchange rate (which would require the Argentine Congress’s approval 
to change it) and paradoxically suffered when Brazil ultimately devalued its currency as 
its domestic goods became too expensive.  Prior to 2001, Argentina had received its 
regularly scheduled loans from the IMF.  In the summer of 2001 a rapid selloff of pesos 
in exchange for dollars began and severely threatened the Argentine economy by 
depleting its foreign reserves.  Based on the precedents set by the U.S. government and 
IMF response to economic crises in Mexico and Brazil just a few years earlier, President 
de la Rúa expected their affirmative response to his request for augmentation to his  
 
 
7 Crandall, 76. 
8 Crandall, 76. 
9 Crandall, 78. 
10 Manuel Pastor and Carol Wise, “Argentina: From Poster Child to Basket Case,” Foreign Affairs 80, 
no. 6 (2001): 60–72.   
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previously scheduled loans.  Neither the Bush administration nor the IMF agreed to the 
increase.  Additionally, the IMF cancelled the terms previously scheduled loan, leaving 
Argentina to fend for itself.  
Is the policy of issuing a bailout to a nation facing economic crisis a carefully 
considered policy tool that is used deliberately to advance U.S. economic or political 
interests?  The answer to this question is important in order to determine whether or not 
vast sums of tax dollars are appropriately allocated.  In all three cases the nations 
similarly followed (to some degree) the liberal economic prescriptions mandated by the 
IMF as conditions to international lending.  In the cases of Mexico and Brazil, significant 
bailouts were offered.  Yet in Argentina a bailout was refused.  Why?  This thesis will 
seek to test three hypotheses for U.S. bailouts in Latin America.  It will argue that the 
more geopolitically significant the nation in the midst of economic crisis, the more likely 
it will receive a bailout.  Additionally, policymakers tend to apply lessons learned from 
past policy choices in their decision to issue a new bailout.      
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this review of the literature I will discuss three potential hypotheses to explain 
the variation in the distribution of U.S. government and IMF bailouts with respect to 
Mexico and Brazil on the one hand and Argentina on the other.   
The first hypothesis for determining the likelihood of a country receiving a bailout 
resides in its geopolitical and economic significance to the United States.  This 
hypothesis states that only geopolitically significant nations will receive a bailout and 
largely focuses on the scope of economic interdependence shared between the United 
States and the country looking for a bailout.  Because of the degree to which a nation’s 
economy is sufficiently intertwined with that of the United States, policymakers may 
deem that country too big to fail.  The potential detrimental effects an economic crisis in 
one country could have on the U.S. economy may incline policymakers to utilize a 
bailout as a policy option.  The U.S. government may consider the use of bailouts as a 
tool if they are politically viable policy measures that promise reward relative their risk.  
Increasing interdependence via free trade will likely improve the calculus that determines 
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whether or not a bailout will be issued.  Because of the heavy influence of the U.S. 
Treasury on IMF decisions, U.S. trade interests also translate into IMF decisions about 
whether or not to bail out a country’s government during crisis.11 
The second hypothesis states that the difference in the political ideology of the 
U.S. ruling party or president will determine the likelihood of bailouts being issued in the 
event of an economic crisis.  Russell C. Crandall’s work, The United States and Latin 
America After the Cold War, argues that domestic politics and personal ideologies of key 
policymakers in Washington have shaped the way the U.S. conducts foreign policy in the 
post Cold War era.12  Oftentimes, these policies are quickly implemented without regard 
for history’s lessons on American involvement in the Western Hemisphere.  By 
emphasizing the need to understand historical case studies as a guide to implementing 
contemporary policy, Crandall’s argument offers a pragmatic way to examine why U.S. 
policy toward Latin America is created without disrespecting history’s facts.  This second 
hypothesis claims that when Democrats hold the presidency in the United States, the U.S. 
government bails out countries in crisis because of ideological stances.  Changes in 
ideology, either domestically or globally, cannot be ruled out as an explanatory variable 
in deciding cases of global financing.13  Democrats can bailout a nation even when 
Republicans control Congress, due to the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF).  The ESF, 
created to ensure the dollar’s stability, makes funds available to the executive without the 
requirement of oversight from the legislature.  
 
11 U.S. dominance of the Fund’s 24-member board can gauged by the weight its vote receives relative 
to other member nations.  Weight for the vote comes from the member nation’s contribution to the Fund.  
The U.S. vote is 18% of the IMF, which is three times more than any other nation.  Only eight board 
members represent individual nations, the rest represent blocs of nations.  Of the eight individually 
represented nations, the G-7 (U.S., Japan, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Canada) often deliberates to come to 
a consensus prior to voting in order to guarantee their consolidated position is adopted.  This information is 
available from multiple sources including Thacker, Blustein, and Crandall.   
12 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 12. 
13 Dennis P. Quinn and A. Maria Toyoda, “Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of 
Financial Globalization,” American Journal of Political Science (Midwest Political Science Association ) 
51, no. 2 (April 2007): 344–363, 344. 
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The literature relating to the idea that policymakers learn from past policy 
decisions is vast.  Peter J. May provides an excellent review of this literature and posits 
the following:  
Learning implies improved understanding, as reflected by an ability to 
draw lessons about policy problems, objectives, or interventions.  The 
lessons are not necessarily refined understandings of policy cause and 
effect that might emerge from formal evaluations or policy experiments.  
Rather, as with trial-and-error learning, learning can simply entail 
judgments about whether a given course of action or a given policy tool is 
still preferred relative to the alternatives currently being promoted.14 
As a third hypothesis, and perhaps as a corollary to the both previous hypotheses, 
I will discuss whether or not across-time learning, despite ideological convictions, by the 
U.S. government occurred with respect to the successful bailout of Mexico in 1995 and 
the failed bailout of Brazil in 1998.  Learning lessons from the risky strategy of over-
borrowing massive amounts of foreign dollars combined with the adherence to the fixed 
exchange rate may be crucial in understanding the dynamics of the crises as well as the 
associated response from foreign lenders.15  The steadfast commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate can, and did in these cases, lead to an overvalued rate of exchange, loan 
defaults, and serious economic crises.16  This policy may have caused the crisis to 
become more sudden and severe.  A country that stringently adhered to this policy, as in 
Argentina’s case, may be denied a bailout if this lesson was in fact learned by 
policymakers. 
This hypothesis suggests that policymakers utilized lessons learned from the 
implementation, timing, and outcomes of the previous bailouts to Mexico and Brazil in 
determining whether or not Argentina would receive a bailout.  Mexico was given a 
bailout following the devaluation of its currency while Brazil was given a bailout in order 
 
14 Peter J. May, “Policy Learning and Failure,”Journal of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press) 
12, no. 4 (October-December 1992): 331–354, 333. 
15 Martin Feldstein, “Argentina's Fall: Lessons from the Latest Financial Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 
(Council on Foreign Relations) 81, no. 2 (March-April 2002): 8–14, 14. 
16 Geethanjali Nataraj and Pravakar Sahoo, “Argentina's Crisis: Causes and Consequences,” Economic 
and Political Weekly (Economic and Political Weekly ) 38, no. 17 (April 26– May 2, 2003): 1641–1644, 
1644. 
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to preempt the devaluation of the real.  Because of the successful and quick repayment of 
the Mexican bailout, political support for the policy in general increased and 
policymakers were more inclined to utilize it as a foreign policy tool to maintain 
economic stability.  The success of the Mexican bailout when compared to the failure of 
the Brazilian bailout could demonstrate the importance of timing with respect to how and 
when to implement this policy effectively and shows that, “Authorities should focus on 
what to do after the crisis instead of attempting to forestall the crisis.”17   
Failure to obtain the necessary granularity on the details surrounding the depth of 
Brazilian crisis in 1998 resulted in the Clinton administration and the IMF formulating a 
response that looked nearly identical to the Mexican bailout three years earlier.18  
Different lessons can be taken from the analysis of each policy decision and will not 
necessarily determine successful policy implementation in the future.  The comparative 
results of both cases may have helped determine Argentina’s fate more so than simply the 
ideology of an American President.  The failure of the Brazilian bailout could have 
reduced necessary support for the U.S. and the IMF policymakers to bailout Argentina in 
2001.  The Argentine government’s commitment to the convertibility law that pegged the 
peso to the dollar eliminated devaluation as an option to stave off the crisis.  By not 
devaluing their currency, the situation in Argentina would have looked strikingly similar 
to the economic crisis in Brazil and the bailout’s failed attempt to prevent the real from 
devaluing in 1998.  If the Bush administration recognized this intricacy, and had 
Argentina devalued its currency and entered into a full-blown crisis, it would have been 
more likely to receive a bailout package similar to the one given to Mexico.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology to be used in this thesis will compare the three cases—Mexico 
in 1995, Brazil in 1998, and Argentina in 2001—to determine the causal mechanism that 
leads to the utilization of a bailout as policy measure by the U.S. government and the 
 
17 Tornell, Westermann and Martínez, 68. 
18 Crandall, 77. 
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IMF to forestall an economic crisis.  The variation among the three cases will be 
examined through three generalized hypotheses.    
 Hypothesis 1: Geopolitical Significance, states that a country that is more 
geopolitically significant to the interests of the United States will be more 
likely to receive a bailout in the event of an economic crisis.  This 
hypothesis will be identified by the short title Geopolitical Significance. 
 Hypothesis 2:  Ideologically Driven, states that the political ideology of 
the U.S. President is the major factor that determines whether or not a 
bailout will be given to a nation in the midst of an economic crisis.  This 
hypothesis will be identified by the short title Ideology.  
 Hypothesis 3:  Learning From Past Policy, states that political leaders in 
the United States learn from the results of past policy decisions and are 
therefore better equipped to determine when and if a nation should receive 
a bailout.  This hypothesis will be identified by the short title Learning. 
This form of methodology will attempt to uncover the distinct characteristics of 
economic crises and associated policy response to better determine the likelihood of a 
bailout being approved for an individual nation experiencing an economic crisis. 
 10
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II. CASES 
A. MEXICO 1995 
This examination of Mexico’s peso crisis to determine the factors that caused the 
U.S. and the IMF to offer Mexico a prompt and massive bailout will first provide a 
narrative of the conditions leading up to the economic crisis.  I will then detail the 
associated U.S. and IMF policy response to the crisis and the outcome of their policy 
choice.   
1. Background Conditions and Economic Crisis 
Prior to Mexico’s financial crisis in December of 1994, both the U.S. government 
and Wall Street advertised Mexico’s free market economic policies as the model for other 
developing nations to follow.19  U.S. government and investor confidence in Mexico’s 
economy was at an all-time high as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
began on January 1, 1994.  The Salinas government wanted to prove the durability and 
growth potential of Mexico’s increasingly globalized market, and NAFTA “codified the 
new rules of the game and greatly reduced the uncertainty faced by investors.”20  The 
new codes restrained the potential for the implementation of sudden protectionist 
measures by both Mexico and the United States.  In addition to the signing of NAFTA, 
Mexico’s commitment to liberalizing most of its markets during President Salinas’ six-
year term is indicated by its: active participation in the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its full membership in such developed-
country associations as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the forum for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  
 
19 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 73. 
20 Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann and Lorenza Martínez, “Liberalization, Growth, and Financial 
Crises: Lessons from Mexico and the Developing World ,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (The 
Brookings Institution) 2003, no. 2 (2003): 1–88, 40. 
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As a result of its sudden “willingness to ‘join the world,’ Mexico had become one 
of the world's most attractive destinations for investment, both direct and portfolio.”21  In 
order to offer foreign investors a sense of stability, and a form of protection against 
inflation, Mexico’s government committed to a fixed exchange rate for its currency, 
whereby the peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar at a ratio of about 3:1.22   Additionally, 
from 1990–1994 the Mexican operational budget balance maintained a surplus.23  
Mexico exhibited sound fiscal discipline throughout this time period, and the peso crisis 
in Mexico should not be attributed to irresponsible fiscal behavior.24      
In this context, a combination of destabilizing attacks on domestic political 
institutions and strict adherence to a policy of fixed exchange rates triggered the peso 
crisis in Mexico.  The destabilizing attacks on domestic political institutions, which 
included terrorism, corruption, and political assassinations, effectively strained the 
Mexican government’s ability to maintain investor confidence.  These factors contributed 
the growing view of Mexico’s ability to provide the stability necessary to attract and 
sustain economic growth through foreign and domestic investment.  The Mexican 
government’s full commitment to the fixed exchange rate policy would artificially 
overvalue the peso in light of these events.    
A year of political turmoil shook Mexico in 1994.  Specific, and the most 
significant, examples of the domestic political turmoil included the shocking, major 
revolt by the insurgent Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), or “Zapatistas,” 
as well as political upheaval and scandal in the wake of the assassinations of two major 
political figures.  The EZLN unexpectedly declared war on the Salinas government on the 
very same day that NAFTA was put into effect, January 1, 1994.  This massive revolt in 
 
21 Gary L. Springer and Jorge L. Molina, “The Mexican Financial Crisis: Genesis, Impact, and 
Implications,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 57–81, 69. 
22 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 74. 
23 Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron Tornell, Andres Velasco, Francesco Giavazzi and Istvan Szekely, “The 
Collapse of the Mexican Peso: What Have We Learned?,” Economic Policy, Vol. 11, No. 22 (Apr., 1996), 
13-63 (Blackwell Publishing ) 11, no. 22 (April 1996): 13–63, 16. 
24 Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron Tornell, Andres Velasco, Francesco Giavazzi and Istvan Szekely, “The 
Collapse of the Mexican Peso: What Have We Learned? ,” Economic Policy, Vol. 11, No. 22 (Apr., 1996),  
13-63 (Blackwell Publishing ) 11, no. 22 (April 1996): 13–63, 16. 
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Mexico’s southern state of Chiapas had an initial violent, yet short-lived, uprising to 
bring attention to the voice of Mexico’s poor in the face of globalization.  The challenge 
to Mexico’s political stability from the Zapatistas “called into question Mexico's new 
status as a ‘more-developed’ nation.”25  This insurgency, rightly or wrongly, dramatically 
damaged investor confidence in the Mexican government’s ability to provide security for 
their ventures.   
Further shocks to Mexico’s political system, during the presidential election year 
of 1994, came from the high-level assassinations of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI's 
original presidential candidate, and Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, who was slated to 
become the leader of the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies of the Mexican Congress.26  
These politically motivated murders strengthened the argument against Mexico’s 
capacity to maintain stability and protect investment by weakening investor perceptions 
about the strength of Mexico’s political institutions.  
These two political shocks in particular led to a dramatic downturn in foreign 
lending to Mexico.  This decrease in lending was not addressed with appropriate 
economic policy changes by the Salinas administration to stabilize the pressures placed 
on the market.27 These factors increased Mexico’s “country risk” and startled 
international investors and the Mexican public who began to sell their Mexican holdings.   
This initial outflow, resulting from political shocks and waning investor 
confidence, triggered a growing increase in the conversion of pesos to dollars at the fixed 
rate of exchange.  As the nation’s dollar reserves began to shrink ever more rapidly, 
investors feared devaluation and incited a “herd mentality” sellout, whereby investors 
sold their holdings simply based on the fact that other people were selling theirs.28  The 
 
25 Gary L. Springer and Jorge L. Molina, “The Mexican Financial Crisis: Genesis, Impact, and 
Implications,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 57–81, 60. 
26 Gary L. Springer and Jorge L. Molina, “The Mexican Financial Crisis: Genesis, Impact, and 
Implications,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 57–81., 62. 
27 Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron Tornell, Andres Velasco, Francesco Giavazzi and Istvan Szekely, “The 
Collapse of the Mexican Peso: What Have We Learned? ,” Economic Policy, Vol. 11, No. 22 (Apr., 1996), 
13–63 (Blackwell Publishing ) 11, no. 22 (April 1996): 13–63, 33. 
28 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
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government did not recognize that this selloff was permanent and believed that demand 
for Mexican assets would return without removing the peg.29  Because of the Salinas 
administration’s miscalculation and unwillingness to float the exchange rate, and thereby 
appreciate the dollar at the peso’s expense, the selloff continued.  Empirically speaking, 
in 1994 Mexico’s foreign-exchange reserves were depleted from a high of $30 billion to 
only $6 billion dollars.  In December alone, approximately $4–$6 billion left the nation’s 
coffers.30 
Finally, on December 20, 1994, and just three weeks into the Zedillo 
administration, the new administration moved swiftly to expand the band in which the 
peso could float by 15.3%.  This move served as the final test of investor fears that the 
currency would be devalued and prompted a final run on the peso.  The following day, 
the Finance Ministry removed the peso’s peg to the dollar and announced it would float 
freely against the dollar.  The peso then promptly lost one half of its value, and the 
Mexican economy officially fell into crisis.31 
2. U.S. and IMF Response 
The Mexican government turned to international support in order to contain the 
crisis.  The Clinton administration feared that the economic crisis in Mexico would 
spread across the border and harm the U.S. economy.32  To prevent such a spread from 
occurring, President Clinton determined that Mexico needed to be bailed out—and fast.  
Support for Clinton’s plan in the Republican-led U.S. Congress dwindled fast, and it 
ultimately rejected Clinton’s planned use of congressionally appropriated funds to 
support this massive loan.  In an unprecedented move, determined to get the bailout to 
Mexico, Clinton sidestepped the legislative process and utilized the U.S. Exchange 
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Stabilization Fund (ESF) to provide the loan.  The ESF, created to ensure the dollar’s 
stability, makes funds available to the executive without the requirement of oversight 
from the legislature.    
Furthermore, to prevent Congress from blocking the loan, Clinton attached 
conditions to the bailout that made it unwilling to move against the bailout.33  These 
conditions “(1) required Mexico to pay interest and fees on medium-term swaps; (2) 
made disbursement of funds contingent on ‘certification’ of Mexico's adherence to strict 
IMF monetary targets; and (3) took the revenues from Mexican oil exports as 
collateral.”34  These conditions provided Clinton a degree of control over Mexico’s 
economic policy and assured him near certain return on the loan by holding Mexico’s oil 
as collateral.  The conditionality requirements attached to the bailout shaped the policies 
that would be enacted to restructure the Mexican economy, while at the same time 
pressured Mexico to repay the loan in order to retain a national hold on the oil reserves.  
It also protected Clinton from moves by his political rivals to stand against his rescue 
package.  
The resulting loan package put together by the U.S. government, the IMF, and 
other international entities totaled $52.8 billion.35  The intent of this package was to 
stabilize the peso and bring investors back to Mexico. 
3. Outcome of the Policy Choice 
The Clinton bailout worked: Mexico’s economy rapidly shrugged the crisis and 
posted hearty economic growth with low associated inflation, and repaid the loan with 
interest in just two years.36  “Mexico registered a $7.4 billion trade surplus in 1995.  Real 
exports were more than 30% higher in 1995 than in 1994, while imports fell more than 8 
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percent.”37  These numbers demonstrate the fact that Mexico would be able to repay its 
debts immediately.  This was a positive sum game where benefits were provided to all 
involved parties: Mexico, the U.S., the IMF, and other international investors.  Mexico 
saw continued economic growth and those who funded the rescue package were repaid 
promptly.  Additionally, the spread of a deeper crisis throughout the region was 
dampened, and a true depression was forestalled.      
B. BRAZIL 1998 
In order to determine the factors that caused the U.S. and the IMF to offer Brazil a 
prompt and massive bailout, this examination will first provide a narrative of the 
conditions leading up to the crisis.  I will then detail the associated U.S. and IMF policy 
response to the crisis and the outcome of their policy choice.   
1. Background Conditions and Economic Crisis 
Traditionally, Brazil’s massive economy has been hamstrung by persistently high 
inflation.  Inflation exceeded 50% per year each year from 1979 to 1994, when it rose to 
over 5,000%.38  In 1994, then Minister of Finance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
introduced Plano Real, a sweeping policy aimed at reducing inflation.  As is indicated by 
the 2.5% rate of inflation posted in 1998, this program was wildly successful, especially 
given Brazil’s chronic struggle against inflation and failed past attempts at stabilization.39  
A key mechanism used by Plano Real to get inflation under control was to strongly link 
its currency to the dollar via a crawling peg.  Implementation of the crawling peg meant 
that the Brazilian Central Bank would attempt to manage the exchange rate within a small 
band in order to maintain parity with the dollar regardless of market pressures. 
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Cardoso was able to parlay this economic success into electoral victory during the 
presidential elections in both 1994 and 1998.  As president, Cardoso failed to maintain 
the necessary fiscal discipline that would complement the success of Plano Real in 
fighting inflation.  Under Cardoso, deficit spending increased to 8.4% of GDP in 1998.40  
It is generally accepted by economists at the IMF that market stabilization is unlikely in 
an emerging market that cannot maintain fiscal discipline.  For comparison, fiscal 
adjustment recommendations by the IMF usually call for a nation to produce a budget 
surplus, while deficit spending in countries in the Euro zone is limited to 3% of GDP. 
In 1998 this macroeconomic strategy began to unravel in the face of a troubled 
international financial system.  Economic crisis struck Russia and many Asian countries, 
many of which devalued their currencies following exchange rate problems similar to 
those faced by Mexico during the peso crisis in 1994.41  Many analysts and speculators 
saw Brazil as the next country likely to fall victim to this crisis and quickly began to sell 
their holdings in Brazil.  To stop the continued selloff and presumably to increase 
demand for the real, the Central Bank raised the interest rates multiple times on their 
long-term bonds.  In fact, interest rates were hiked to over 40% per year in 1998.42  In the 
context of a sizeable fiscal deficit and the deteriorating global economic situation, this 
strategy failed to create a real sense of stability for its investors, who continue to dump 
their assets.  At a high of $74 billion in August of 1998, Brazil’s reserves had fallen to 
$42 billion by the time Cardoso returned to office following his reelection later that 
year.43   
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2. U.S. and IMF Response 
The Clinton administration watched this situation in Brazil and feared that an 
economic crisis, were it to hit, could have catastrophic consequences for the rest of the 
region due to its large economy.  Prior to the devaluation of the Brazilian real, the 
Brazilian economy was the ninth largest in the world, after the G-7 and China, and 
represented over 35% of the Latin American economy when examined by GDP.44   The 
magnitude of this economy indicates its capacity to influence and affect the markets of 
throughout the region.   
With a feather in their cap from successfully reversing Mexico’s crisis in 1994, 
the Clinton White House and the IMF that decided action to prevent a crisis in Brazil 
would be necessary.45  In order to prevent a crisis a massive bailout package would be 
put together.  This time the Clinton administration would try to prevent the devaluation of 
the real by filling the Brazilian Central Bank’s dwindling reserves with dollars.  In theory 
this massive influx of dollars would stabilize the Brazilian economy by stopping the run 
on currency.  Investors, however, would prove not to see this policy in the same light as 
the U.S. and IMF architects of the rescue package.   
The U.S.-designed bailout totaled $41.5 billion, which came from the IMF, the 
U.S. Treasury, and other international investors.  The Clinton administration again 
utilized executive discretion via the ESF to provide the U.S. portion of the loan and 
eliminate any congressional debate about the appropriation of tax dollars.  This package 
was delivered to Brazil without much discussion or debate from Clinton’s political 
opposition.  
This package was substantially different from the bailout given to Mexico in two 
very significant ways.  First, Mexico was given a bailout following the devaluation of its 
currency and significant loss of its dollar reserves, whereas, the Brazilian bailout was 
issued prior to the real’s devaluation.  Secondly, Mexico’s bailout was protected by 
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tangible collateral in the form of revenue from its massive oil reserves and stringent fiscal 
conditionality, while the loan to Brazil did not utilize collateral to protect itself in the 
event of a default.  This loan, however, was not disbursed to Brazil without Cardoso’s 
commitment to near-term fiscal reform.  Prior to the approval of the bailout, President 
Cardoso, with enthusiastic IMF support, announced a bold austerity program that cut 
spending and raised taxes.46 
3. Outcome of the Policy Choice 
This bailout quickly and ultimately proved to be a failure.  Devaluation of the real 
was not preempted by the rescue package.  The $41.5 billion bailout designed to defend 
the real was trumped by the Brazilian Central Bank’s decision to abandon the policy of 
pegging its currency to the dollar and ultimately devalue the real in January of 1999.  “On 
January 15, with capital flight eroding Brazil's reserves, the real was allowed to float 
freely. The unintended result was a panic-driven massive depreciation of the real's 
exchange value by 60% in a few days.”47  Panic of this sort can be largely attributed to 
the fact that international investors did not view the newly filled reserves in the Brazilian 
Central Bank as a sign of market stability.  Rather, they saw it as an opportunity to 
maintain the value of their investments by completely unloading their Brazilian assets in 
exchange for the freshly minted dollars.  The bailout did not prevent the Brazilian 
economy from collapsing; it simply delayed its fall and protected the wealth of individual 
investors by offering them a final chance to dump their Brazilian assets before the Central 
Bank allowed the real to float and devalue.  
C. ARGENTINA 2001 
In order to determine the factors that caused the U.S. and the IMF not to offer 
Argentina a prompt and massive bailout during its economic crisis I offer this section as a 
historical primer.  First, I will provide a narrative of the conditions leading up to the 
crisis.  I will then detail the associated U.S. and IMF response to the crisis and the 
outcome of their choice.   
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1. Background Conditions and Economic Crisis 
The popular connotation of Argentina’s fall from its position as a neoliberal 
“poster child” to that of a risky “basket case” is indicative of the economic chaos and 
failure that befell the country in 2001.  Not so long ago, in the early 1990s, Argentina’s 
Washington Consensus-style economic policies and performance were highly touted by 
both the U.S. government and the IMF as the preeminent model for emerging markets to 
emulate.48  Despite the free market “poster child” label often associated with the 
Argentine economy, many of the country’s policies contradicted the free market 
principles that many people perceived it had adopted.  However, these statements of 
support provided a necessary sense of market stability within Argentina that drew record 
amounts of foreign investment into the country.  The recent economic crisis that hit 
Argentina in 2001 rapidly changed that perception of stability for the worse, and revealed 
the contradictions in its economic policies.   These factors spooked investors who then 
sent their investment to more stable markets. 
Argentina saw significant economic growth during President Carlos Menem’s 
tenure as his nation’s chief executive from 1989–1999.  Between 1991–1997 Argentina’s 
real GDP grew at an average rate of 6.1% and ranked at the top of Latin American 
economies.49  The initial trigger for increased economic growth came from the 
recognition that continuous periods of hyperinflation would not attract investors.  To 
address Argentina’s perpetual concern with inflation, Menem and his Economy Minister, 
Domingo Cavallo, introduced the Convertibility Law. 
Established in 1991, this law was designed to end Argentina’s legacy of 
hyperinflation by strictly pegging the value of the peso to the dollar at a rate of 1:1.  This 
policy effectively ended inflation and increased investor confidence in Argentina’s 
market stability, but at the same time, it hamstrung the government’s capacity to  
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influence the economy through monetary and exchange rate policies.  Notably, the 
inflexible nature of their strict exchange rate policy limited the government’s ability to 
react during a recession. 
At first the Convertibility Law appeared to be exactly what Argentina needed to 
start its journey toward economic prosperity.  It stopped the hyperinflationary trends that 
had plagued the country for many years.  With inflation under control, the government 
began a series of reforms that lowered barriers to trade, privatized state-owned 
enterprises, and deregulated many sectors of the economy.50  Privatization policies and 
continuous GDP growth increased the Argentina’s attractiveness as an investment 
opportunity.  The systematic liberalization of the market produced economic growth by 
attracting foreign money.  Because of this apparent economic stability, investors bought 
Argentine assets rapidly.  
If so many signs seemed to indicate economic progress why did an economic 
crisis strike Argentina?  According to many economists, the two proximate causes of the 
economic crisis in Argentina were (1) an overvalued fixed exchange rate and (2) an 
excessive amount of foreign debt.51  These two conditions translated into a tangible 
problem that would affect a majority of Argentines.  
Because the exchange rate was fixed at too high a level, Argentina 
exported too little and imported too much. This trade imbalance stood at -
829 million US$ in 1999 and made it impossible for the country to earn 
the foreign exchange it needed to pay the interest on its foreign debt. 
Instead, Argentina had to borrow to meet those interest payments, causing 
the debt to grow even larger. The external debt as a percentage of GNP 
increased from 39.2 per cent in 1995 to 55.67 percent in 2000.52   
In spite of the tremendous growth and productivity increases that Argentina 
experienced in the 1990s, the Menem administration did not institute disciplined fiscal 
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policies to reign in government spending.  Fiscal discipline is an important principle to 
those who advocate orthodox economic reform.  In fact, under Menem, Argentina 
continued to operate under significant budget deficits.  During the times Argentina 
experienced economic growth, Menem should have produced a budget surplus to reduce 
the impact of potential future economic downturns.  However, his government did not 
produce a single balanced budget or surplus during his entire tenure.  In 1991 the deficit 
was 3.5% of GDP and grew to 6.4% of GDP in 2001.  At the same time, the public debt 
grew from 38.8% of GDP (65 billion pesos) in 1991 to 64% of GDP (172 billion pesos) 
in 2001.53  Coupled with increased national borrowing to pay debt, these massive budget 
deficits crippled Argentina’s economy.  
The IMF and investors in Argentina seemed to ignore these damning numbers and 
continued to believe in the sense of stability provided by the Convertibility Law.  This 
belief would only last as long as the Argentine Central Bank could provide dollars in 
exchange for pesos.  By 2000, Argentina’s Central Bank had successfully defended the 
value of the peso in the wake of three major shocks to the international economic system: 
the Mexican Crisis in 1994, the Asian Crisis in 1997, and the Brazilian Crisis in 1998.  
Each time, this defense of the currency depended on the accumulation of even more 
foreign debt.  In 2000, Argentina’s financial situation was rapidly deteriorating as 
investors sold their emerging market assets en masse.54  Investors then began to fear the 
grim data presented on the country’s balance sheet. 
The Clinton administration analyzed this situation and feared that the devaluation 
of Argentina’s peso would shock the international economic system at a time that it could 
ill afford a crisis.55  To forestall this scenario, Clinton supported an IMF brokered rescue 
package designed to protect the peso’s value from collapsing.  This package set aside 
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$20 billion in exchange for Argentina’s agreement to a set of austerity measures designed 
to rein in debt and enforce fiscal discipline to raise revenue and reduce spending.56  
In the summer of 2001, billions of dollars left Argentina as investors converted 
their pesos for dollars.  Seven billion dollars in Argentina’s dollar reserves left the 
country in July alone.  The money set aside for this loan could not get into the Argentine 
coffers fast enough.  Even though about $6 billion of this loan had been disbursed, 
President Fernando de la Rúa requested an immediate $8 billion augmentation to the 
already scheduled loan designed to defend the peso.  Without the disbursement of this 
additional money, de la Rúa feared a catastrophic economic meltdown in his country.  
This time, in order to increase the dollar amount of the IMF loan, Argentina would have 
to garner the support of the administration of the newly elected President of the United 
States, George W. Bush.  The new administration was well known for its rhetorical 
support of free market principles and ideological disposition against bailouts. 
2. U.S. and IMF Response 
Upon receiving de la Rúa’s augmentation request in August 2001, the IMF and its 
largest stakeholder, the United States Treasury, deliberated whether or not to continue 
support the Argentine government with additional loans that it claimed to need to stave of 
a severe and contagious financial crisis.  Delegations from both the IMF and the U.S. 
Treasury Department were dispatched to Buenos Aires in order to assess the gravity of 
the economic situation and to lay out the terms and conditions required of Argentina in 
order to continue disbursement of their assistance package.   
The debate inside the Bush administration regarding the bailout of Argentina was 
divided. While the Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors advocated severing financial 
assistance to Argentina in order to end the era of Clinton-style bailouts and set a 
precedent for how it would deal with countries in similar fiscal situations, the other 
stakeholders in the argument argued for a program that would provide Argentina some 
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sort of assistance.57  These other stakeholders were extremely valued by the Bush White 
House and included the Treasury Department, State Department, and the National 
Security Council.  President Bush decided to defer his decision on an Argentine support 
package to the IMF. 
While the IMF deliberated the fate of the Argentine bailout, a run on their banks 
started in late November.  Determined to maintain convertibility, the de la Rúa 
administration instituted the corralito on December 1, 2001.58  The corralito limited the 
amount of cash that Argentines could withdraw from their personal savings accounts to just 
$250 per week.  This decree also banned all transfers of money abroad that were not related 
to trade.  This swift action by the government was designed to halt the run on banks that was 
in full swing across the nation.  During the last three days of November alone $3.6 billion 
dollars was withdrawn from accounts across the nation.59  This policy choice also incited 
violent riots throughout the country that left more than a dozen citizens dead.60 
The corralito effectively destroyed the Argentine commitment to convertibility 
because people were no longer able to freely interchange pesos and dollars.  It also 
occurred without consulting the IMF in advance.61   As a result, the IMF decided not to 
continue its support of Argentina with further loans.  Finally, on December 5, 2001, the 
IMF cut off Argentina’s financial lifeline by cancelling the previously scheduled loan 
installment of $1.24 billion for a failure to comply with the agreed conditions.62  The 
United States agreed with the IMF assessment and similarly refused to continue to 
finance Argentina’s government.   
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3. Outcome of the Policy Choice 
The decision of the IMF and the Bush administration to decline Argentina’s 
request for a bailout came as a surprise to President de la Rúa because of the precedents 
set by the bailouts given to Mexico in 1994 and Brazil in 1998.63  The effects of the 
decision not to give Argentina a bailout were traumatic and dramatically affected the 
lives of Argentine citizens.  Argentina’s economy collapsed as a result of the IMF and 
U.S. decision not to provide Argentina with a bailout.  This collapse caused civil unrest 
and political turmoil in Argentina. 
The violent mass protests in late December 2001 led to the immediate resignation 
of President de la Rúa and Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo.  Between December 21, 
2001, and January 1, 2002, the Argentine Presidency changed hands five times, all within 
the legal framework of their constitution.  Finally, hoping to end the political turmoil, 
Congress elected Eduardo Duhalde to the presidency on January 1, 2002.   
On January 6, 2002, the Duhalde government devalued the peso and expunged the 
previously inviolable convertibility system that Argentina had championed for a decade.   
This necessary but painful decision caused the peso to fall from its long lasting parity 
with the dollar to a point in June 2002 where each peso was worth just 26 cents.  The 
effects of this decision froze the ability of Argentina’s banks to lend money and caused 
economic output to fall 11%.  This, in turn, caused the rate of poverty in Argentina to 
soar to a point where nearly 60% of the population in Argentina was living below the 
poverty line.64   
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III. ANALYSIS 
This section will thoroughly analyze the three cases—Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina—utilizing the three hypotheses selected to explain the variation found in the 
historical policy decisions made to address economic crises.   
A. HYPOTHESIS 1: GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUNTRY 
The first hypothesis predicts that a country that is more geopolitically and 
economically significant to the interests of the United States will be more likely to 
receive a bailout in the event of an economic crisis.  Conversely, a country of little 
geopolitical or economic significance to the United States will be more unlikely to be 
denied a bailout in the event of an economic crisis.  The most important measures I will 
use to assess a country’s significance include the degree of trade with the United States, 
economic and political interdependence with the United States, and policymaker 
statements. An examination of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina during economic crisis is 
relevant in explaining the variation in the resulting policy choices made across country 
cases.  This analysis will reveal that Mexico and Brazil were deemed geopolitically 
significant, while Argentina was not.  Therefore, the cases lend support for the 
hypothesis. 
1. Mexico 
The geopolitical significance of Mexico to the United States is tremendous, 
thereby lending support to the hypothesis.   This geopolitical significance stems from the 
high degree of trade, a shared border, common problems requiring cooperative efforts, 
and the importance of Mexico’s economic success to domestic U.S. markets.  The impact 
of an economic crisis in Mexico would threaten U.S. market stability and its domestic 
economy in general.  An additional measure of geopolitical significance is how 
supportive a nation is for U.S.-led initiatives in recognized international forums. 
Both Mexico and Brazil have large, established trading relationships with the 
United States.  Argentina does not.  To support this claim, the following data regarding 
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trade statistics for each country with respect to their imports to the U.S. and exports from 
the U.S. from 1992–2002 is presented.65  During these years, imports from Mexico to the 
United States ranged between $35 billion to nearly $136 billion.  Imports from Brazil to 
the United States ranged between $7.4 billion to nearly $16 billion.  At the same time, 
imports from Argentina ranged between $1.2 billion to $3.3 billion.  Exports from the 
United States to Mexico during this same time period ranged between $40.5 billion to 
$111.3 billion.  In Brazil, these exports ranged between $5.7 billion to $15.8 billion.  At 
the same time in Argentina, these exports ranged between $1.6 billion to $5.8 billion.  
Mexico obviously dominates the scene as the United States’ number one trading 
partner in Latin America.  However, Brazil is the United States’ second largest trading 
partner in Latin America, largest South American trading partner, and has become 
increasingly important over time.  Its trade relationship with the United States is 5 times 
larger than Argentina’s trade relationship with the United States.  Argentina’s impact on 
the U.S. economy is negligible.  In all three periods of economic crisis we see a decline in 
that particular nation’s ability to buy U.S. goods.  With these trade factors in mind, 
Argentina’s inability to buy U.S. goods or offer a comparative advantage in other sectors 
relative to Mexico and Brazil increasingly reduces their relative worth to U.S. 
policymakers when deciding on where to invest.  
At the time of the peso crisis, Mexico’s importance as a dominant trading partner 
with the United States was solidified with the implementation of NAFTA that very same 
year.  In 1994, Mexico was the United States’ third largest trading partner, behind Japan 
and Canada.  At the same time, the United States was Mexico’s largest trading partner.66  
The robust nature of the trade relationship connecting between these two countries is 
indicative of a high degree of associated economic and geopolitical significance.  The 
U.S. imported goods totaling approximately $49 billion in 1994 and $62 billion in 1995 
 
65 Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.  Source: Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://tse.export.gov (accessed August 30, 2009). 
66 David Gould and Michelle Thomas, “Beyond the Border: A Look at the Top U.S. Trading 
Partners,” The Southwest Economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas), no. 6 (November/December 1995): 
10. 
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from Mexico.  Exports to Mexico from the U.S. totaled approximately $51 billion in 
1994 and $46 billion in 1995.67  The high degree to which the economies of the U.S. and 
Mexico are intertwined by trade creates a situation where both crisis and prosperity in 
one of the countries will similarly affect the other country.  Therefore, ending or even 
preventing crisis and promoting prosperity in either country is a logical aim for U.S. 
policymakers.   
At 3,141 kilometers in length, the border between the United States and Mexico is 
the ninth longest in the world.  This vast border sees over 1,000,000 legal crossings per 
day.68  The necessity of a cooperative relationship between the governments of the 
United States and Mexico is becoming increasingly significant to policymakers, as 
various interest groups have emerged to impact the manner in which the U.S. deals with 
issues pertaining to its southern neighbor.  These interest groups are extremely varied and 
include labor unions and corporate lobbyists, American nativists and recent Mexican 
immigrants.  Recognizing and understanding the high degree of cultural, industrial, 
economic, and municipal interdependence of both nations along the border area, 
colloquially and regionally known as MexAmerica, improves the knowledge of those in a 
position to craft formal foreign policy that is consistent with the informal structures and 
practices of the regional municipalities already in place.  These actualities formally 
increase Mexico’s geopolitical significance to U.S. policymakers. 
As a result of their close proximity to one another, Mexico and the United States 
face many common problems that require cooperative solutions.  Cooperation among 
policymakers ensures a greater degree of interdependence by integrating the efforts of 
both nations to seek solutions that benefit both nations.  The problems they face range 
from criminal to political to economic issues, including: drug trafficking, immigration, 
and advancing free trade policies.  The high degree of cooperative efforts and 
interdependence between the two nations is a tangible measure of Mexico’s value to the 
 
67 Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.  Source: Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://tse.export.gov (accessed August 30, 2009). 
68 Fernando Romero, Hyperborder: The Contemporary U.S— Mexico Border and its Future (New 
York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), 9. 
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U.S.  Recent cooperative policies enacted by the two governments include: The Smart 
Border Agreement, Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety 
and Security (OASISS), Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), and 
the Action Plan to Combat Border Violence and Improve Public Safety.  Therefore, 
Mexico is highly likely to be considered geopolitically significant to the United States 
and would be given assistance in times of crisis. 
International politics must also be considered when deciding whether or not a 
bailout will be issued.  Strom Thacker posits that, “Special treatment received by any 
particular debtors may be better explained by political factors than by their position in the 
international financial system or their relationship with creditor banks.”69  Mexico’s 
record of alignment with U.S.-supported initiatives in recognized international forums 
leading up to the peso crisis are tepid at best.  In the United Nations (U.N.), Mexico votes 
against the United States in more than one-half of all votes (62% in a 1997 study).70  One 
factor that would mitigate Mexico’s tepid support of the U.S. in the U.N. is the 
ratification of NAFTA.  This is the most significant economic agreement that Mexico 
possesses, since the U.S. is its largest trading partner.   
Another logical way to assess Mexico’s voting record in the U.N. is that it 
opposes the United States because it is a geopolitically significant sovereign power.  As 
such, Mexico can vote its interests and not worry about placating the United States.  
Therefore, even though Mexico does not support the U.S. in the U.N. at all times, it 
remains geopolitically significant as a result of either its massive free-trade agreement or 
its ability to vote its own interests in international forums. 
Mexico is geopolitically significant and therefore supports the hypothesis that a 
geopolitically significant country will receive a bailout.  The U.S. and the IMF bailed out 
Mexico from its economic crisis because it was geopolitically significant enough to 
provoke their action. 
 
69 Strom C. Thacker, “The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics (The John's Hopkins 
University Press) 52, no. 1 (October 1999): 38–75, 58. 
70 Bryan T. Johnson, “U.S. Foreign Aid and United Nations Voting Records,” The Heritage 
Foundation, June 12, 1998, http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg1186.cfm 
(accessed August 30, 2009). 
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2. Brazil 
The geopolitical significance of Brazil to the United States is tremendous and 
lends support to the hypothesis.  Although the U.S. trade relationship with Brazil was not 
nearly as robust as the U.S. trade relationship with Mexico at the moment of crisis, many 
other factors demonstrate Brazil’s geopolitical significance.  These factors include the 
size and diversified nature of its economy, its large population, and its dominant role in 
South American politics.  The impact of an economic crisis in Brazil threatens regional 
market stability by hamstringing the economies of the other South American economies.  
An additional measure of geopolitical significance is how a nation votes with respect to 
U.S.-led initiatives in recognized international forums.  
Of major significance, Brazil’s population of 165 million is the largest in South 
America and the fifth largest in the world.71  A population this large presents an ideal 
opportunity for investors to grow new markets and expand industrial capacity.  
Additionally, the economy of Brazil was the tenth largest in the world in 1999; which 
even exceeded the size of the Russian economy.72  Brazil’s economy is the most 
diversified and industrialized economy in South America.  Rich in natural resources and 
industrial capacity, many of their industrial and service products compete well 
internationally.  The service sector of the Brazilian economy is highly advanced and 
comprises 65.8% of GDP.  Notable aspects of its service sector are banking and 
telecommunications.  Its industrial sector is similarly advanced and makes up 28.7% of 
GDP.73  The goods from this sector are wide-ranging and include everything from shoes 
to petrochemicals and commercial aircraft.  These industries are much more advanced 
than the simple maquiladora assembly plants found in Mexico.  A population of this 
magnitude coupled with its large, industrial economy has the potential to become an 
important and sturdy market for consumers and labor alike.  Juan de Onis claims that out 
of all the "big emerging markets," China, India, and Indonesia included, Brazil’s 
 
71 These population statistics are from 1999.  Current data sizes their population at more than 190 
million. 
72 Juan de Onis, “Brazil's New Capitalism,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2000: 107–119, 109. 
73 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Background Note: Brazil,” U.S. Department of State, July 
2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm - econ (accessed October 5, 2009). 
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economic and political prospects for becoming a modern, "first world" economy are the 
highest.  Bearing witness to this fact is the $300 billion in foreign investment that had 
been sent to Brazil by the year 2000.74  
The U.S. trade relationship with Brazil, although not as intense as the relationship 
with Mexico, remains important.  Outside of Mexico, Brazil is the United States’ largest 
Latin American trading partner.  From 1997–1998, the U.S. imported over $19 billion in 
goods from Brazil and exported over $31 billion.75  According to current U.S. census 
data, Brazil is the United States’ tenth largest trading partner in the world with a trade 
relationship valued at over $21 billion through June 2009.  Although the U.S. trade 
relationship with Brazil is not of the same magnitude or maturity as its relationship with 
Mexico, Brazil is the United States’ largest trading partner in South America.  Therefore, 
Brazil has been and remains economically significant to the interests of the United States. 
Another point of relevance related to Brazil comes from its geographic location 
within South America.  Brazil borders nine other nations and occupies over half of the 
South American continent.  These nine other nations are key to Brazil’s ability to 
increase its exports and grow its economy.  Nine individual border nations provide Brazil 
with an opportunity to sell the wide-ranging products created by its industrial base.  As an 
emerging market, this geographic relevance provides a situation where the potential for 
market expansion is tremendous.  Consequently, the economic crisis that struck Brazil 
had a severe negative impact on the smaller economies that it shares a border with.  This 
crisis reduced investor confidence regionally and caused massive capital outflows.  A 
good measure of this effect is GDP.  Latin America’s GDP grew 5.3% in 1997, 
diminished to 2.3% in 1998, and in 1999 regional plummeted to just 0.3%.76 
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Even though Brazil does not support the U.S. in the U.N. most of the time, it 
remains geopolitically significant as a result of its role as a stabilizer within MERCOSUR 
and South America more generally.  Brazil’s record of alignment with U.S. initiatives in 
recognized international forums leading up to the economic crisis is weak.  In the U.N., 
Brazil voted against the United States more than half the time (57% in this 1997 study).77  
As with Mexico, a geopolitically significant nation can oppose the United States in 
international forums in order to demonstrate its sovereignty and forward its interests. 
In addition to U.S. trade interests and international politics, there is also the 
question of whether—and the extent to which—the nation requesting a bailout mitigates 
the risk by pledging collateral or demonstrating some degree of political institutional 
stability. More collateral in a more stable, and therefore investor-friendly, political 
environment, might encourage the U.S. government to go through with the bailout.  
Mexico offered up its massive oil reserves as collateral for the loan: “The United States 
designed the support package as a straight business deal: (1) it required Mexico to pay 
interest and fees on medium-term swaps; (2) it made disbursement of funds contingent on 
"certification" of Mexico's adherence to strict IMF monetary targets; and (3) it took the 
revenues from Mexican oil exports as collateral.”78  In contrast, Brazil’s government did 
not pledge anything as collateral and still received the bailout package.  However, Brazil 
was politically stable, and market-friendly, as is indicated by the reelection of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso as President in 1998.  
One additional international political factor that demonstrates Brazil’s 
significance is its position as the largest economy in the Common Market of the South 
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world’s fifth largest trading bloc.  Brazil’s power within MERCOSUR has helped keep 
the organization focused on South American free trade and away from the political affairs 
championed by Venezuela.79   
The factors outlined above clearly indicate Brazil’s prominence, both politically 
and economically, in Latin American stability.  Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, Robert 
Rubin said, “While there are no certainties, we believe that this is the right program both 
for the people of Brazil and for the economic well-being of the American people.”80  His 
statement ties the health of the U.S. economy to that of the Brazilian economy and 
signifies Brazil’s significance in the eyes of the Clinton administration.  Louis Uchitelle 
quotes an economist from a prominent Wall Street firm as saying, ''It is very clear from 
the statements being made by top officials in the Clinton Administration that Brazil is 
fundamental to the system.  There is just no way they can allow Brazil to fail.''81  The 
statements from senior Clinton administration officials and the analysis of these 
statements by major financial houses demonstrate that Brazil is geopolitically significant 
to the United States and that this particular case supports the hypothesis.  The U.S. and 
the IMF bailed out Brazil from its economic crisis because it was geopolitically 
significant enough to provoke their action. 
3. Argentina 
The case for Argentina’s geopolitical insignificance is as strong as the case for the 
geopolitical significance of both Mexico and Brazil.  Argentina’s small population, 
relative isolation from U.S. markets, temporary political instability, and lack of support 
for U.S.-led initiatives in recognized international forms severely limits its effect on the 
global economy and political situation.  The impact of an economic crisis in Argentina 
would likely be isolated to its borders and have little if any adverse effect on the United 
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States economy.  Therefore, because Argentina is of little geopolitical significance to the 
United States it did not receive a bailout and lends further support to this hypothesis.   
In 2001 Argentina maintained a population of just 35 million people.82  As such, 
its potential to develop a robust market relationship with the U.S. is severely limited, 
especially when compared throughout Latin America to the large established trading 
relationships it maintains with Mexico and Brazil.83  Argentina’s ability to find a 
comparative advantage in trade with the United States is further hampered by the 
notoriously rigid nature of its labor laws and strong union pressures.84  Without a 
common border or structured free trade agreement, U.S. trade with Argentina was 
negligible.  Rather than engage in trade with Argentina, it was more efficient for the 
United States to either produce domestically or import from other emerging markets.   
These facts surrounding the trade relationship limit Argentina’s geopolitical significance. 
A potential mitigating factor for a nation of seemingly low geopolitical 
significance is its support of the initiatives promoted by the United States in recognized 
international forums.  These votes can help sway the opinion of the U.S. government 
when considering a bailout.  Argentina’s record of voting with the U.S. in the U.N. is 
relatively weak and inconsistent.  In fact in a 1997 study, Argentina voted against U.S. 
initiatives in the U.N. 44% of the time.85  A nation of relatively low geopolitical 
significance like Argentina with few other options to garner economic support from the 
United States may have been able to turn political capital gained by voting more 
frequently for the initiatives developed and supported by the U.S. in the U.N. into 
approval of its bailout augmentation request. 
Following the decision in December 2001 by the IMF and the United States to 
deny the Argentine loan request, political turmoil struck the country.  The revolving door 
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of the presidency saw five transfers of power in just a two-week period.  This period was 
marked by violent protest and general instability.  These actions may have officially 
ended the close debate within the Bush administration regarding their stance on 
administering some sort of aid to Argentina.  Even though the transfers of executive 
power were accomplished in accordance within the scope of their Constitution’s 
authority, an outsider would have judged the situation as chaotic and stereotypical of 
weak Latin American governments.  In fact, Paul Blustein notes that during this debate 
some administration officials stated, “Argentina’s geopolitical significance paled by 
comparison with Turkey’s, so if the Bush team was going to take a stand against bailouts, 
Argentina would be a good place to do it.”86  Additionally, the rhetoric in Argentina at 
the time of their crisis claimed that the U.S. abandoned them because their country was 
“not of geopolitical significance.”87 
In the case of the economic crisis that occurred in Argentina in 2001, a bailout 
was not issued due to its relatively low geopolitical significance.  Therefore, in this case, 
the hypothesis is supported. 
4. Hypothesis Validity 
The first hypothesis predicts that a country that is more geopolitically and 
economically significant to the interests of the United States will be more likely to 
receive a bailout in the event of an economic crisis.  Conversely, a country of little 
geopolitical or economic significance to the United States will be more unlikely to be 
denied a bailout in the event of an economic crisis.   A comparative analysis of the cases 
of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina during economic crisis explained the variation in the 
resulting policy choices made across country cases.  This analysis revealed that Mexico 
and Brazil were geopolitically significant to the United States, while Argentina was not.  
Accordingly, the Geopolitical Significance hypothesis is supported by the comparison. 
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B. HYPOTHESIS 2: U.S. EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY 
This hypothesis states that the political ideology and belief system of the U.S. 
President is a major causal factor that determines whether or not a bailout will be given to 
a nation in the midst of an economic crisis.  A president ideologically committed to 
utilizing the bailout as a policy tool will be more likely issue a bailout in the event of an 
economic crisis.  Conversely, a president ideologically opposed to utilizing the bailout as 
a policy tool will be more unlikely to deny a bailout to a country experiencing an 
economic crisis.  An examination of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina during economic 
crisis is relevant in explaining the variation in the resulting policy choices made across 
time and presidency.  The logic of the comparative method reveals that the variation in 
these three country cases cannot be explained by presidential ideology and must be 
ascribed to other factors. 
1. Mexico 
The ideology and political will of President Clinton and his administration 
appeared to play a large role in ensuring that the Mexican economy would be bailed out 
following the 1994 crisis.  His personal belief in NAFTA’s potential for success, even 
though it was contested among members of his own party, drove him to provide Mexico a 
bailout, even though the U.S. Congress rejected it.  His determination to see the bailout 
through, even without legislative support, is indicative of the crucial role of the ideology 
and personal beliefs of the White House in this case in determining to whom a bailout 
should be issued. 
Originally an idea proposed by President Salinas in Mexico, NAFTA promised to 
increase economic benefits to each of its three members.  Even though it promised to 
bring the theoretical benefits of free trade to all three North American countries, NAFTA, 
initially, was not overwhelmingly popular with the American people or their 
representatives in congress.  In fact, ratification of NAFTA passed the House by a slim 
margin, 234-200.88  The implementation of NAFTA by U.S. lawmakers came at the 
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expense of a large amount of political capital by President Clinton, who received 102 
votes for and 156 votes against the treaty from representatives of his own party in the 
House vote.89  Because of the strong opposition in his own party, Clinton was more 
inclined to ensure the success of the treaty by mitigating anything that may cause it 
setbacks or threaten its chances for success.  The tremendous amount of political capital 
Clinton spent in ensuring NAFTA’s passage could not be wasted on the initiative’s 
failure so soon after its implementation. 
When the Congress rejected Clinton’s bailout proposal, he moved swiftly to leave 
Congress on the sidelines and secure a rescue passage by utilizing funds from the ESF.  
This move was bold and ensured that Clinton alone would be responsible for the success 
or failure of this policy choice.  This action to bypass congress and “go it alone” is a clear 
demonstration of the large impact a President’s ideology and belief system plays in 
determining who should receive a bailout. 
President Clinton’s own statements regarding this bailout further support this 
argument.  He said, “We simply couldn’t stand aside and let Mexico fail without trying to 
help,” and explained that he wanted to reverse the selfish and shortsighted nature of 
American foreign policy in Latin America.90  His ideological convictions towards 
reducing Latin American resentment of America impacted his policy choice to bail out 
Mexico.  
The hypothesis that bailouts can be explained by the executive’s ideological 
stance, therefore, finds support in the Mexican case.  President Clinton’s legacy would, in 
no small part, be determined by the success or failure of NAFTA due to the large amount 
of effort he spent in ensuring its passage.  To protect this legacy, Clinton undertook huge 
political risk by ensuring an unpopular policy choice was implemented when he invoked 
the ESF and ensured a bailout to Mexico.  These actions by the President clearly show 
the validity of this hypothesis in the case of policy response to Mexico’s peso crisis in 
1994.  
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2. Brazil 
The case of Brazil’s economic crisis and U.S. response adds further support the 
notion that the political ideology and belief system of the U.S. President is the major 
factor that determines whether or not a bailout will be given to a nation in the midst of an 
economic crisis.  The ideology and political will of President Clinton and his 
administration played a large role in ensuring that the Brazilian economy would be bailed 
out in the midst of the 1998 crisis.  His personal belief in utilizing the bailout as a key 
part of economic policy is indicated by his willingness to use it on so many occasions.  
Regarding the bailout to Brazil, Clinton stated that it was, “consistent with our new 
policy of trying to prevent failure and its spread to other nations.”91  His Treasury 
Department worked closely with the IMF to design and implement bailouts to many 
countries in economic crisis.  His determination to implement massive rescue packages, 
even without legislative support in most cases, is indicative of the crucial role of the 
ideology and personal beliefs of the President in determining when and to whom a bailout 
should be issued. 
The regularity of Clinton era bailouts adequately represents his belief in their 
usefulness.  Following the bailout given to Mexico, the Clinton administration designed 
and supported IMF sponsored bailouts to many nations throughout Asia during the 1997-
1998 regional financial crisis.  These bailouts totaled $125.3 billion with $57 billion of 
that total going to South Korea alone.92  After these bailouts were issued, another 
massive bailout totaling $22 billion was created and sent to Russia in the summer of 
1998.93   
Clinton again avoided congressional confrontation by utilizing the Treasury 
Department to more readily implement his policy choices.  Through the Treasury, Clinton 
was able to use the ESF at will and effectively remove the Congress’ responsibility for 
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oversight of tax dollar appropriation.  Additionally, the U.S. Treasury worked closely 
with the IMF to design and finance the non-U.S. portion of the bailouts.  These steps to 
bypass traditional and legitimate checks on executive authority to ensure the President’s 
choice of policy boldly demonstrate Clinton’s ideological commitment to the bailout as 
an appropriate option for nations mired in economic crisis.  
The hypothesis that ideology matters finds further support in the decision by 
President Clinton to support the Brazilian bailout.  Clinton’s widespread use of the 
bailout as a policy option both inside and outside of Latin America are representative of 
his personal beliefs in its effectiveness.   
3. Argentina 
This hypothesis states that the political ideology of the U.S. President is the major 
factor that determines whether or not a bailout will be given to a nation in the midst of an 
economic crisis.  The presidency of George W. Bush was vastly different from that of the 
Clinton presidency in terms of its willingness to utilize the bailout as a regular tool of 
foreign policy.  As previously demonstrated, President Clinton’s administration regularly 
utilized bailouts in attempts to forestall economic crises throughout the world.  A major 
shift in this form of policy occurred under the Bush administration and its realpolitik 
view of foreign policy.  The new President was deeply skeptical toward the use of 
bailouts as policy tool and sought to avoid using American tax dollars to pay for what he 
perceived as poor decisions made by the leaders of other nations.94  Although the 
previous statement can be construed as fact based on the administration’s rhetoric, its 
actions in other cases appear to violate those same principles and invalidate the 
usefulness of this hypothesis as the primary causal factor in determining which countries 
should receive a bailout. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will discriminate between bailouts of foreign 
nations and domestic industries and corporations.  Analyzing the policy of a bailout 
issued to an industry in a domestic context is not a valid comparison to make over time 
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and in contrast with the bailout of a foreign nation.  Therefore, I will limit this analysis to 
the Bush administration’s use or nonuse of the bailout relative only to foreign policy 
conducted by states and international organizations. 
In spite of its ideological and rhetorical opposition toward the bailout as a foreign 
policy tool, the Bush administration used it on many occasions.  The most notable 
occasions germane to this discussion happened in Latin America and at nearly the same 
time Argentina’s request for an additional bailout was denied.  In August of 2002, Bush’s 
Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, supported IMF brokered assistance packages for both 
Brazil and Uruguay.  With respect to Brazil, O’Neill stated, ''I continue to favor support 
for Brazil and other nations that take appropriate steps to build sound, sustainable and 
growing economies.''  He also commented that, ''Uruguay deserves the ongoing support 
of the international financial community for its commitment to sound economic 
policy.''95  The same article was noticeably absent remarks regarding a bailout for 
Argentina who was also in the middle of a deep economic crisis. 
The Brazilian and Uruguayan cases demonstrate that although the Bush 
administration was ideologically opposed to bailouts in general, the use of a bailout use 
as a tool of foreign policy was not off the table.  In fact, O’Neill’s comments indicate that 
the administration’s willingness to support a bailout for a nation hinged on the 
perception, be it real or imagined, that the nation’s economic practices were sound, 
sustainable, and realistic.  The Bush administration’s use of the bailout as a policy tool 
was not driven solely by blanket ideology.  Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported in 
the case of Argentina’s denied bailout. 
4. Hypothesis Validity 
The ideological convictions of American presidents do not offer sufficient 
explanation in determining whether or not a bailout will be issued to a country 
experiencing an economic crisis.  Former President William J. Clinton offered a bailout 
to Mexico and Brazil, while former President George W. Bush refused a bailout to 
Argentina.   
 
95 Richard W. Stevenson, “U.S., in Shift, Says It Backs Latin Bailouts,” New York Times, August 2, 
2002, Late Edition (East Coast) ed.: C.1. 
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Clinton, who had much political capital invested in NAFTA, was focused on the 
crises’ risk to the U.S. economy and to proving the viability of free trade as a preferred 
policy measure. Due to the increasingly interdependent nature of the trade relationships, 
his administration supported the idea that foreign bailouts were an integral part of 
reducing the potential of the devastating effects of an economic crisis from spreading 
across national borders.  Clinton proved his belief in this policy by boldly advocating the 
bailout to Congress and then acting on it alone when Congress failed to support his policy 
choice with respect to the Mexican economic crisis in 1995.  A Republican Congress 
unwilling to approve a bailout for Mexico was trumped by Clinton’s utilization of the 
ESF to fund the relief.  
The Bush administration handled Argentina’s economic crisis a different 
perpective.  Steven Levitsky argued, “The Bush administration combined a deep 
skepticism toward bailouts . . . with a narrow realpolitik foreign policy vision.”96  This 
administration did not want to provide nations practicing what they perceived as poor 
economic policy with an automatic bailout.  With an ideological predisposition against 
“handouts,” this administration would not reward bad behavior.97  Despite its ideological 
rhetoric denouncing bailouts, the Bush White House supported IMF designed bailouts for 
both Brazil and Uruguay in 2002.  This is particularly puzzling since Argentina had often 
been touted as the Latin American model for Washington Consensus-style economic 
reform in the 1990s and the Bush administration would not call these sorts of reforms bad 
behavior or poor economic policy.  “Perhaps more than any other country in the region, 
Argentina’s economic officials dutifully implemented the free market policies such as 
trade liberalization that were encouraged by the U.S. government and private banks.”98  
In fact, “from 1991 to 1998 the economy grew at an average rate of 6% a year, reaching a 
total gross domestic product of nearly $300 billion, with almost no inflation.”99  All of 
 
96 Steven Levitsky, “Argentina: From Crisis to Consolidation (and Back),” in Constructing 
Democratic Governance in Latin America, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter, 244–268 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 257. 
97 Crandall, 73. 
98 Crandall, 70. 
99 Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting 
of Argentina, Kindle Edition (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 257–267. 
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these are generally considered signs of economic health and align with the ideology of a 
conservative president.  Despite these market reforms, Argentina never resolved its fiscal 
policy and continued to increase its deficit each year.  Therefore, although the ideology of 
the ruling leader may play a role in determining the likelihood of a bailout’s approval in 
some cases, it does not appear to provide sufficient cause to generalize it as the 
determining factor in deciding the outcome of a request for a bailout.  Thus the 
comparison of these three cases eliminates this hypothesis as the causal factor in 
determining who should receive a bailout. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 3: U.S. EXECUTIVE LEARNING FROM PAST POLICY 
CHOICES 
Policymakers determine policy based on the lessons they have learned from past 
policy decisions regardless of whether or not the “right lessons” are learned and applied.  
This hypothesis states that political leaders in the United States learn from the results of 
past policy decisions and apply those lessons when determining whether or not a bailout 
will be issued to a nation experiencing an economic crisis.  An examination of Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina during economic crisis is relevant in explaining the variation in the 
resulting policy choices made across time and presidency.  This analysis will reveal that 
policy learning occurred in all three cases. 
1. Mexico 
The bailout issued to Mexico following its 1994 peso crisis was, at the time, the 
largest financial assistance package ever issued to a nation enduring an economic crisis.  
A loan of $52.8 billion to a failed economy within a month of its collapse is a risky 
venture, especially in an emerging market.  “Learning need not be restricted to learning 
about policy tools or interventions. Learning can entail new or reaffirmed understanding 
of policy problems or objectives.”100  President Clinton believed that the United States 
often “got what it deserved” when its policy choices towards Latin America were 
shortsighted and selfish, and he sought to redress these policy shortcomings with policies 
 
100 Peter J. May, “Policy Learning and Failure ,” Journal of Public Policy (Cambridge University 
Press) 12, no. 4 (October-December 1992): 331–354, 334. 
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based on honest friendship and not an unequal partnership.101  That said, to examine 
whether this policy was a result of learning from past policy or lack of appropriate policy, 
I will examine the Mexican bailout with respect to the Latin American debt crisis in the 
1980s and the associated policy response by the U.S. government and the IMF.  
The Latin American debt crisis officially began in August 1982 when Mexico's 
government announced that it would no longer be able to service its debt.102  Important 
similarities surrounding this crisis can be applied to the peso crisis in 1994.  Massive 
depreciation of the peso coupled with depletion of the Central Bank’s foreign reserves 
caused investors and banks to become wary.  This situation led commercial banks to 
refuse financing to Mexico and essentially halted Mexico’s ability to trade.   
A series of short-term, high interest loans issued by the Mexican government to 
investors continued to deplete Mexico’s reserves and failed to address the problem 
appropriately.  The economic situation in Mexico became very dire as it slowly achieved 
enough growth from trade to cover the interest on its external debt.  Restructuring debt 
and economic policies continued at a sluggish pace throughout the 1980s without much 
success.  The restructuring served to pay the interest on previously scheduled loans and 
created a situation where the debt burden was so large it could not possibly be paid back.  
Regionally, the interest alone on foreign loans amounted to 5% of gross domestic product 
(GDP).  This system of chasing loans with more loans became a vicious cycle that was 
completely unsustainable.  The Mexican economy served only to pay interest to its 
creditors and could not make necessary investments toward lasting development.  This 
form of support clearly did not work to address the crisis and limit its duration and 
spread. 
 
101 Bill Clinton, My Life: The Presidential Years, Volume 2 (New York, New York: Random House, 
2005), 233. 
102 Alexander Theberge, “The Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s and its Historical Precursors,” 
Working Paper, April 8, 1999, http://www.columbia.edu/~ad245/theberge.pdf (accessed August 29, 2009), 
9.  Tomes have been written on the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s.  My intention in this paper is to 
condense the debt crisis into a workable summary relavent to policy learning with respect to the peso crisis.  
I do not mean to gloss over the debt crisis in an overly simplistic manner.  This paper does not specificly 
deal with the debt crisis and will avoid getting bogged down into its more complex arguments.  Theberge 
provides an excellent summary of the events leading up to the debt crisis.  The facts and numbers I use to 
explain the debt crisis come from his work. 
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Retrospectively, an argument can be made to support an immediate bailout of 
Mexico in 1982.  This swift and massive loan would have likely dampened the effects of 
the crisis and erased the negative effects of compiled interest accumulation from the 
series of short-term and high-interest loans issued by a hodgepodge of lenders throughout 
the 1980s.  The impact of the debt crisis on the United States reduced Mexico’s ability to 
by U.S. goods and also increased illegal immigration.   
The results from the debt crisis and the reference to the 1980s as the “lost decade” 
in Latin America provide a convincing case for the willingness of the Clinton 
administration to select some form of a policy choice that could prevent a repeat of the 
previous decade’s poor economic performance and adverse impact on the United States.  
President Clinton believed that an economic crisis in Mexico would reduce trade between 
the two countries, cause a 30% rise in illegal immigration, and increase the power of 
Mexico’s drug cartels.103  By swiftly choosing to bailout Mexico in 1994, Clinton 
demonstrated an unwillingness to accept a slow and protracted recovery in Mexico and to 
prevent the economic crisis from spreading throughout the region as it did in the 1980s.  
Therefore, the Mexican peso crisis adds support to this hypothesis.  
2. Brazil 
Political leaders in the United States that learn the “right” lessons from the results 
of past policy decisions are better equipped to determine when and if a nation should 
receive a bailout.  Learning implies that the political leaders are able to analyze the 
outcomes of past policy decisions as points of reference that can be used to make future 
policy decisions when presented with similar situations and circumstances.  In this 
analysis of the bailout given to Brazil, many contemporary comparisons exist to help 
examine the details of the conditions that led to the bailout.  At the time that this bailout 
was announced David Sanger wrote that this policy to calm the global financial markets 
 
103 Bill Clinton, My Life: The Presidential Years, Volume 2 (New York, New York: Random House, 
2005), 231. 
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was a gamble that hoped to succeed where others failed.104  This statement implies that 
the policy decision to bail out a nation preemptively had been tried recently with 
lackluster results.  In fact, the Clinton administration’s prolific support of the bailout as a 
policy tool provides this analysis many cases to observe whether or not learning occurred.  
I will specifically look at the Brazilian bailout relative to the bailouts given to Mexico, 
Asia, and Russia and reveal how the administration learned from these policy choices, 
but applied the wrong lessons in crafting their new policies.   
Russell Crandall writes that the bailout offered to Brazil by the U.S. and the IMF 
was based on the successful rescue package formulated in response to Mexico’s peso 
crisis.  Furthermore, he makes a key distinction in the structure of the two bailouts that 
led to success in Mexico and failure in Brazil.105  The bailout given to Mexico was 
disbursed following the full devaluation of the peso and did not try to artificially prop up 
the overvalued exchange rate.  However, in Brazil, the purpose of the bailout was to 
preempt the devaluation of the real by filling the Central Bank’s reserves with dollars and 
thereby stopping the run on the currency.  The individual investors simply exchanged 
their reals for dollars prior to the overvalued currency’s eventual devaluation did not 
follow the wishes of the policymakers.  Even though these newly filled reserves were 
depleted, the Brazilian government was still responsible for repaying the loan.  This 
bailout simply worsened the economic condition in Brazil.  By issuing Brazil a bailout, 
the Clinton administration demonstrated that the lesson they learned from Mexico’s 
bailout was that the policy generally works.  Unfortunately, this was the wrong lesson to 
apply to the economic crisis in Brazil.  If the administration had learned the right lesson, 
they would have waited for the real to devalue prior to issuing the bailout to Brazil. 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis and subsequent bailouts offer additional data 
points relevant to the discussion on policy learning.  The countries hit hardest by this 
crisis were Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea.  Briefly stated, Thailand is considered 
 
104 David E. Sanger, “Brazil Bailout: 2 Gambles for U.S.,” The New York Times, November 14, 1998, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/14/us/brazil-bailout-2-gambles-for-us.html (accessed September 5, 
2009). 
105 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 77–78. 
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to be the epicenter of from which this crisis spread to the rest of Asia.    Stanley Fischer, 
former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, stated that the causes of this crisis 
can be attributed to the culmination of the following factors: overvalued exchange rates 
based on a strong peg to the dollar, increasing fiscal deficits, excessive exchange rate risk 
due to external borrowing, and a lack of political commitment to institute and maintain 
orthodox reforms.106  These factors caused a rapid devaluation of the national currencies 
—very similar to the genesis of Mexico’s economic crisis.   
All three countries suffered a loss in investor confidence and as a result faced 
rapidly depreciating currencies.  Much like Mexico, Thailand and South Korea had 
essentially lost all of their usable reserves and requested a bailout in order to stabilize 
their markets.  Indonesia, on the other hand, called for a bailout to preempt a run on its 
foreign reserves by artificially overvaluing its currency.  Keeping disbursement timing in 
mind, the bailouts given to Thailand and South Korea prompted a swift recovery while 
the Indonesian bailout did not.107  Stanley Fischer claimed, as a direct lesson from the 
Mexican crisis in 1994-1995, that the value of the currencies in Asia would have 
continued to fall without a bailout, and in order “to reverse this process, countries have to 
make it more attractive to hold domestic currency, and that means temporarily raising 
interest rates, even if this complicates the situation of weak banks and corporations.”108  
However, this statement does not recognize the point during an economic crisis at which 
bailouts can be issued to ensure the greater likelihood of policy success.  Recognition of 
the reasons behind the policy successes in Thailand and South Korea and the failure in 
Indonesia would have better equipped Clinton’s bailout architects to craft a more useful 
and successful bailout package for Brazil. 
The bailout of Russia in 1998 is most germane to the discussion on policy 
learning due to its similarity and timing relative to the Brazilian case.  The Russian 
 
106 Stanley Fischer, “The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF,” International Monetary Fund, January 
22, 1998, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/012298.htm (accessed September 6, 2009). 
107 IMF Staff, “Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF,” International Monetary 
Fund, June 2000, http://imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm (accessed September 4, 2009). 
108 Stanley Fischer, “The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF,” International Monetary Fund, January 
22, 1998, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/012298.htm (accessed September 6, 2009). 
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bailout was issued a few months prior to the Brazilian bailout.  It is interesting to note 
that the Clinton administration went to great lengths to distinguish the differences 
between the bailout given to Russia and the one given to Brazil.  Treasury Secretary 
Robert E. Rubin stated that, in comparison to Russia, this bailout was “totally distinct— 
‘totally’ is a strong word, but in all relevant respects, a totally different situation than the 
situation in Russia," because Russia failed to adopt economic reforms.”109  In Russia, the 
IMF prescriptions were embraced for three weeks following the bailout.  Support for 
these measures in the Russian Parliament dissipated as soon as the currency devalued.  
The Russian Parliament then refused to implement the austerity measures.110  Even 
though President Cardoso made strong rhetorical commitment to orthodox fiscal reforms, 
his actual capacity to fully implement them was thwarted by his Congress and the strong 
state Governors.  If policymakers had learned the right lessons, the administration would 
have recognized many important similarities between the two cases. 
An examination based purely on the economic situations in both Russia and 
Brazil demonstrates strikingly similar conditions leading up to their bailouts.  Both 
bailouts failed to forestall currency devaluation.  If the administration had learned from 
the case of failure presented by the bailout of Russia, then the bailout in Brazil would not 
have been structured so similarly to protect the value of their currency and attempt to 
preempt its devaluation.  “Indeed, the discouraging results from the Russian and Brazilian 
packages suggested that large financial bailouts failed to prevent crises, but nonetheless 
sweetened the pockets of international investors.”111    
The Clinton administration appeared to predicate their wanton use of the bailout 
based on the rescue package crafted for Mexico without due regard for the reasons behind 
its success.  Learning would have occurred had they examined the details of the many 
bailouts given throughout Asia and in Russia leading up to the bailout of Brazil.  The 
 
109 Paul Blustein, “U.S., IMF Announce Plan To Avert Brazilian Crisis; Loan Package Totals $41.5 
Billion,” The Washington Post, November 14, 1998: A.01. 
110 David E. Sanger, “Brazil Bailout: 2 Gambles for U.S.,” The New York Times, November 14, 1998, 
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111 Russell C. Crandall, United States and Latin America After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge 
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failed bailouts of Indonesia and Russia in 1998 should have signaled the administration 
that a near identical policy response attempting to preempt the economic crisis in Brazil 
would fail in similar fashion.  The numerous bailouts structured by the Clinton 
administration provided a missed opportunity for policymakers to refine their craft and 
properly analyze conditions where a massive rescue package is likely to succeed and 
where it is likely to fail.  Learning, however wrong it was, did occur in this case.  Even 
though the Clinton administration applied the wrong lessons from past policy choices to 
future similar cases, this hypothesis is supported when examining the bailout given to 
Brazil in 1998 because lessons, however wrong, were learned.  
3. Argentina 
This hypothesis states that political leaders in the United States learn from the 
results of past policy decisions and are therefore better equipped to determine when and if 
a nation should receive a bailout.  The concept of learning implies that political leaders 
are able to analyze the outcomes of past policy and use those results to make corrections 
to future policy decisions when presented with similar cases.  Prior to Argentina’s denied 
request for a bailout by both the IMF and the United States, the Bush administration was 
able to analyze the recent historical uses of this policy tool by both the Clinton 
administration and the IMF.  The Bush administration had multiple cases of successful 
and unsuccessful bailout attempts to review and from which to draw key distinctions to 
better decide when this policy is maximally effective.   
The notion of replenishing a nation’s coffers with dollar reserves during an 
economic crisis was specifically addressed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill in 
conversation with his Argentine counterpart Domingo Cavallo.  O’Neill told him “that 
using the Fund’s resources in a conventional way—to replenish reserves—would not help 
put the country on a sustainable path.”112  This statement is a result of O’Neill’s analysis 
of the Clinton administration’s support for the failed bailouts issued to Russia and Brazil 
just a few years earlier.  These bailouts artificially held up the exchange rate just long 
 
112 Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the 
Bankrupting of Argentina, Kindle Edition (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 2418. 
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enough for major investors to withdraw their investments at a favorable rate before the 
reserves were emptied and the currencies devalued.   
In Argentina, the Convertibility Law stringently pegged the peso to the dollar and 
did not allow the Central Bank to alter the exchange rate based on market forces.  A 
review of Argentina’s reluctance to alter monetary policy reveals clear parallels to the 
failed bailout issued to Brazil in 1998.  Prior to devaluation of the real, a massive loan 
was issued to Brazil that increased investor perceptions of market instability and caused a 
run on the banks.  This bank run drained the newly replenished reserves and forced the 
devaluation of the real and drove Brazil deep into an economic crisis.  O’Neill did not 
favor this sort of rescue where “the IMF throws money at everybody and the private-
sector people get to take their money out.”113   
Had Argentina devalued its currency and allowed market forces to determine the 
depth of the crisis, as was the case in Mexico, the debate within the Bush administration 
may have come out in their favor.  The bailout given to Mexico was successful and due in 
a large part to the timing at which it was disbursed.  The peso was devalued and the 
economy had collapsed.  Therefore, an opportunity for investors to profit on a subsidized 
and arbitrarily overvalued exchange rate was not presented.  This indicates that policy 
learning did occur while determining whether or not to bailout Argentina. 
The Bush administration appeared to predicate their use of the bailout based on 
internal debate and analysis of previous bailouts.  Learning from outcomes of the bailouts 
and conditions present within Brazil and Mexico at the times of their economic crises 
allowed the Bush administration to be more selective in its use of the bailout as a policy 
tool. The numerous bailouts structured by the Clinton administration provided an 
opportunity for the Bush administration to refine their craft and properly analyze 
conditions where a massive rescue package is likely to succeed and where it is likely to 
fail.  Therefore, this hypothesis is supported by this case. 
 
113 Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the 
Bankrupting of Argentina, Kindle Edition (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 2428. 
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4. Hypothesis Validity 
Policymakers determine policy based on the lessons they have learned from past 
policy decisions regardless of whether or not the “right lessons” are learned and applied.  
This hypothesis states that political leaders in the United States learn from the results of 
past policy decisions and apply those lessons when determining whether or not a bailout 
will be issued to a nation experiencing an economic crisis.  An examination of Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina during economic crisis and through two different presidential 
administrations revealed that policy learning occurred in all three cases.  Therefore, the 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The distillation of the results of the three cases—Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina—
tested against the three major hypotheses is represented in the following table: 
 Geopolitical Significance Ideology Learning Bailout? 
Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Brazil Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Argentina No Yes Yes No 
Hypothesis Valid? Yes No Yes  
The above summary table demonstrates that, of the three main hypotheses, 
Geopolitical Significance and Learning from past policy are useful in determining 
whether or not a country will receive a bailout from the United States or IMF in the event 
of an economic crisis.  To generalize these findings, I offer the following statement: All 
else being equal, the greater the geopolitical significance of a country in economic crisis 
requesting a bailout from the United States and the IMF, the more likely its request will 
be met.  Conversely, a bailout request from a country of little geopolitical significance 
will likely be denied.  Learning will be discussed separately.  
Another generalization that can be drawn from this examination of the three cases 
is that adherence to orthodox market reforms alone will not secure support for a bailout 
request from the United States or the IMF.  All three nations analyzed in this thesis 
demonstrated various degrees of wavering from the orthodox economic prescriptions 
touted by the U.S. and the IMF.  Mexico and Brazil maintained their notions of sovereign 
governance and mitigated their deviance from the orthodox policies individually.  Mexico 
provided its oil reserves as collateral while Brazil marketed its political stability and role 
as a potential South American hegemony to secure its request for a bailout.  Argentina, 
on the other hand, offered no collateral and fell into a violent and chaotic political mess.  
If the situation in Argentina appeared more stable and secure to outside observers in the 
United States, and had the Argentine government offered some sort of significant 
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collateral to support their request for a bailout, it may have mitigated its relatively low 
geopolitical significance and received the rescue package it was looking for.   
The analysis of the cases selected suggests other intricacies exist to effect the 
generalized statement above, and make it more or less likely that the United States and 
the IMF will approve a bailout request.  For instance, policy learning can occur across 
time and presidential administration.  This is dependent upon diligent advisors capable of 
learning the right lessons from a situation and the wise application of those same lessons 
to similar cases in the future.  These advisors must have the ability to overcome the 
ideological bent of the administration by providing facts that necessitate and prove the 
likelihood of success of one policy choice over another in a given situation.  This is not 
easy to accomplish, as these cases show both instances where policy choice trumped 
ideology as well as instances where ideology trumped policy choice. 
With respect to the Clinton administration, the right lessons from Mexico’s 
bailout were not learned and properly applied to Brazil’s bailout.  However, the 
administration did learn lessons from the Mexican bailout and use them to frame their 
future bailout policy decisions.  The successful bailout of Mexico in 1995 reinforced the 
administration’s view of the bailout as an effective policy choice without learning from 
when it was issued during the cycle of their crisis.  Examination of its success shows that 
when it is issued after a currency is fully devalued by market forces, a bailout is more 
likely to work as advertised and stimulate the nation’s economy.  The lesson that the 
Clinton administration learned and applied to Brazil’s economic crisis three years later 
was not specifically linked to the timing of the bailout, but rather more generally to the 
notion that bailouts just work.  If they had waited to issue the bailout to Brazil following 
the devaluation of the real, it would have had a better chance of success.  This case 
provides a clear example where the wrong lesson was learned and subsequently 
reinforced the administration’s prevalent ideology in support of bailouts and was 
improperly applied to a similar case with negative results.  In this case learning occurred 
but it was infected by ideology. 
The bailout augmentation request that the IMF and the Bush administration 
denied to Argentina in late 2001 demonstrates an example of a case where effective 
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learning from past policy occurred.  By 2001, there were many instances of bailouts that 
could be examined and their lessons applied to similar cases.  The vigorous internal 
debate that divided the Bush administration’s senior advisors over whether or not to issue 
Argentina another bailout demonstrates a case where the right lessons were learned.  
Treasury Secretary O’Neill recognized that conventional bailouts issued prior to a 
currency’s devaluation where “the IMF throws money at everybody and the private-
sector people get to take their money out,” are not effective.114  President Bush’s choice 
to support the IMF’s analysis and decision regardless of the outcome with respect to the 
Argentine request indicates that the debate internal to his administration supplanted his 
general ideological opposition to bailouts.  This is a case where policy learning trumped 
ideology. 
Leaders in a position to issue massive loans must recognize the merit of each 
request for a bailout on its own without regard for ideology.  In doing this, a more 
qualified determination of the potential success or failure of the policy can be made.  
Geopolitical significance alone should not determine whether or not a country receives a 
bailout.  If the United States or the IMF only issues bailouts to geopolitically significant 
nations, then proper economic and policy analysis are not involved in the calculus.  This 
will lead to a higher rate of loan default and overall policy failure.  Lessons drawn from 
each bailout, successful or not, and applied without regard to ideology or politics, will 
ensure a better rate of success for future bailouts. 
 
114 Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the 
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